Decision theory formally solves the problem of rational agents in uncertain worlds if the true environmental probability distribution is known. Solomonoff's theory of universal induction formally solves the problem of sequence prediction for unknown distribution. We unify both theories and give strong arguments that the resulting universal AIξ model behaves optimal in any computable environment.
Introduction
The most general framework for Artificial Intelligence is the picture of an agent interacting with an environment [RN95] . If the goal is not pre-specified, the agent has to learn by occasional reinforcement feedback [SB98] . If the agent shall be universal, no assumption about the environment may be made, besides that there exists some exploitable structure at all. We may ask for the most intelligent way an agent could behave, or, about the optimal way of learning in terms of real world interaction cycles. Decision theory formally 1 solves this problem only
1 With a formal solution we mean a rigorous mathematically definition, uniquely specifying the solution. For problems considered here this always implies the existence of an algorithm which asymptotically converges to the correct solution.
if the true environmental probability distribution is known (e.g. Backgammon) [Bel57, BT96] . [Sol64, Sol78] formally solves the problem of induction if the true distribution is unknown but only if the agent cannot influence the environment (e.g. weather forecasts) [LV97] . We combine both ideas and get a parameterless model AIξ of an acting agent which we claim to behave optimally in any computable environment (e.g. prisoner or auction problems, poker, car driving). To get an effective solution, a modification AIξ tl , superior to any other time t and space l bounded agent, is constructed. The computation time of AIξ tl is of the order t · 2 l . The main goal of this work is to derive and discuss the AIξ and the AIξ tl model, and to clarify the meaning of universal, optimal, superior, etc. Details can be found in [Hut00b] .
Rational Agents & Sequential Decisions
Agents in probabilistic environments: A very general framework for intelligent systems is that of rational agents [RN95] . In cycle k, an agent performs action y k ∈ Y (output word) which results in a perception x k ∈ X (input word), followed by cycle k+1 and so on. If agent and environment are deterministic and computable, the entanglement of both can be modeled by two Turing machines with two common tapes (and some private tapes) containing the action stream y 1 y 2 y 3 ... and the perception stream x 1 x 2 x 3 ... (The meaning of x k ≡ x ′ k r k is explained in the next paragraph):
working Agent p tape ... working Environ− ment q tape ... ) P P P P P P P i 1 P P P P P P P q p is the policy of the agent interacting with environment q. We write p(x <k ) = y 1:k to denote the output y 1:k ≡ y 1 ...y k of the agent p on input x <k ≡ x 1 ...x k−1 and similarly q(y 1:k ) = x 1:k for the environment q. We call Turing machines p and q behaving in this way chronological. In the more general case of a probabilistic environment, given the history yx <k y k ≡ y 1 x 1 ...y k−1 x k−1 y k , the probability that the environment leads to perception x k in cycle k is (by definition) µ(yx <k yx k ). The underlined argument x k in µ is a probability variable and the other nonunderlined arguments yx <k y k represent conditions. We call probability distributions like µ chronological.
The AIµ Model: The goal of the agent is to maximize future rewards, which are provided by the environment through the inputs x k . The inputs x k ≡ x ′ k r k are divided into a regular part x ′ k and some (possibly empty or delayed) reward r k . The µ-expected reward sum of future cycles k to m with outputs y k:m = y p k:m generated by the agent's policy p can be written compactly as
where m is the lifespan of the agent, and the dots abovė yẋ <k indicate the actual action and perception history. The µ-expected reward sum of future cycles k to m with outputs y i generated by the ideal agent, which maximizes the expected future rewards is
i.e. the best expected credit is obtained by averaging over the x i and maximizing over the y i . This has to be done in chronological order to correctly incorporate the dependency of x i and y i on the history. The outputẏ k , which achieves the maximal value defines the AIµ model:
The AIµ model is optimal in the sense that no other policy leads to higher µ-expected reward. A detailed derivation and other recursive and functional versions can be found in [Hut00b] . [RN95, Hut00b] . Due to the use of complete histories as state space, the AIµ model neither assumes stationarity, nor the Markov property, nor complete accessibility of the environment. Every state occurs at most once in the lifetime of the system. As we have in mind a universal system with complex interactions, the action and perception spaces Y and X are huge (e.g. video images), and every action or perception itself occurs usually only once in the lifespan m of the agent. As there is no (obvious) universal similarity relation on the state space, an effective reduction of its size is impossible, but there is no principle problem in determiningẏ k as long as µ is known and computable and X, Y and m are finite.
Reinforcement learning: Things dramatically change if µ is unknown. Reinforcement learning algorithms [LK96, SB98, BT96] are commonly used in this case to learn the unknown µ. They succeed if the state space is either small or has effectively been made small by generalization or function approximation techniques. In any case, the solutions are either ad hoc, work in restricted domains only, have serious problems with state space exploration versus exploitation, or have non-optimal learning rate. There is no universal and optimal solution to this problem so far. In the Section 4 we present a new model and argue that it formally solves all these problems in an optimal way. The true probability distribution µ will not be learned directly, but will be replaced by a universal prior ξ, which is shown to converge to µ in a sense.
Algorithmic Complexity and Universal Induction
The problem of the unknown environment: We have argued that currently there is no universal and optimal solution to solving reinforcement learning problems. On the other hand, [Sol64] defined a universal scheme of inductive inference, based on Epicurus' principle of multiple explanations, Ockham's razor, and Bayes' rule for conditional probabilities. For an excellent introduction one should consult the book of [LV97] . In the following we outline the theory and the basic results.
Kolmogorov complexity and universal probability: Let us choose some universal prefix Turing machine U with unidirectional binary input and output tapes and a bidirectional working tape. We can then define the (conditional) prefix Kolmogorov complexity [Cha75, G74, Kol65, Lev74] as the length l of the shortest program p, for which U outputs the binary string x = x 1:n with x i ∈ {0, 1}:
and given y
The universal semimeasure ξ(x) is defined as the probability that the output of U starts with x when provided with fair coin flips on the input tape [Sol64, Sol78] . It is easy to see that this is equivalent to the formal definition
where the sum is over minimal programs p for which U outputs a string starting with x. U might be non-terminating.
As the short programs dominate the sum, ξ is closely re-
. ξ has the important universality property [Sol64] that it dominates every computable probability distribution ρ up to a multiplicative factor depending only on ρ but not on x:
The Kolmogorov complexity of a function like ρ is defined as the length of the shortest self-delimiting coding of a Turing machine computing this function. ξ itself is not a probability distribution 2 . We have ξ(x0)+ξ(x1) < ξ(x) because there are programs p, which output just x, neither followed by 0 nor 1. They just stop after printing x or continue forever without any further output. We will call a function ρ ≥ 0 with the properties ρ(ǫ) ≤ 1 and xn ρ(x 1:n ) ≤ ρ(x <n ) a semimeasure. ξ is a semimeasure and (5) actually holds for all enumerable semimeasures ρ.
Universal sequence prediction: (Binary) sequence prediction algorithms try to predict the continuation x n of a given sequence x 1 ...x n−1 . In the following we will assume that the sequences are drawn from a probability distribution and that the true probability of a string starting with x 1 ...x n is µ(x 1:n ). The probability of x n given x <n hence is µ(x <n x n ). If we measure prediction quality as the number of correct predictions, the best possible system predicts the x n with the highest probability. Usually µ is unknown and the system can only have some belief ρ about the true distribution µ. Now the universal probability ξ comes into play: [Sol78] has proved that the mean squared difference between ξ and µ is finite for computable µ:
A simplified proof can be found in [Hut99] . So the difference between ξ(x <n x n ) and µ(x <n x n ) tends to zero with µ probability 1 for any computable probability distribution µ. The reason for the astonishing property of a single (universal) function to converge to any computable probability distribution lies in the fact that the set of µ-random sequences differ for different µ. The universality property (5) is the central ingredient for proving (6).
Error bounds: Let SPρ be a probabilistic sequence predictor, predicting x n with probability ρ(x <n x n ). If ρ is only a semimeasure the SPρ system might refuse any output in some cycles n. Further, we define a deterministic sequence predictor SPΘ ρ predicting the x n with highest ρ probability. Θ ρ (x <n x n ) := 1 for one x n with ρ(x <n x n ) ≥ ρ(x <n x ′ n ) ∀x ′ n and Θ ρ (x <n x n ) := 0 otherwise. SPΘ µ is the best prediction scheme when µ is known. If ρ(x <n x n ) converges quickly to µ(x <n x n ) the number of additional prediction errors introduced by using Θ ρ instead of Θ µ for prediction should be small in some sense. Let us define the total number of expected erroneous predictions the SPρ system makes for the first n bits:
The SPΘ µ system is best in the sense that E nΘµ ≤ E nρ for any ρ. In [Hut99] it has been shown that SPΘ ξ is not much worse
and the tightest bound for ρ = Θ µ . For finite E ∞Θµ , E ∞Θ ξ is finite too. For infinite E ∞Θµ , E nΘ ξ /E nΘµ n→∞ −→ 1 with rapid convergence. One can hardly imagine any better prediction algorithm as SPΘ ξ without extra knowledge about the environment. In [Hut00a] , (6) and (8) have been generalized from binary to arbitrary alphabet and to general loss functions. Apart from computational aspects, which are of course very important, the problem of sequence prediction could be viewed as essentially solved.
The Universal AIξ Model
Definition of the AIξ Model: We have developed enough formalism to suggest our universal AIξ model. All we have to do is to suitably generalize the universal semimeasure ξ from the last section and to replace the true but unknown probability µ in the AIµ model by this generalized ξ. In what sense this AIξ model is universal and optimal will be discussed thereafter.
We define the generalized universal probability ξ AI as the 2 −l(q) weighted sum over all chronological programs (environments) q which output x 1:k , similar to (4) but with y 1:k provided on the "input" tape:
Replacing µ by ξ in (3) the iterative AIξ system outputṡ
(10) in cycle k given the historyẏẋ <k .
(Non)parameters of AIξ: The AIξ model and its behaviour is completely defined by (9) and (10). It (slightly) depends on the choice of the universal Turing machine. The AIξ model also depends on the choice of X and Y , but we do not expect any bias when the spaces are chosen sufficiently large and simple, e.g. all strings of length 2
16 . Choosing IN as word space would be ideal, but whether the maxima (or suprema) exist in this case, has to be shown beforehand. The only non-trivial dependence is on the horizon m. Ideally we would like to chose m = ∞, but there are several subtleties to be discussed later, which prevent at least a naive limit m → ∞. So apart from m and unimportant details, the AIξ system is uniquely defined by (10) and (9) without adjustable parameters. It does not depend on any assumption about the environment apart from being generated by some computable (but unknown!) probability distribution as we will see.
ξ is only a semimeasure: One subtlety should be mentioned. Like in the SP case, ξ is not a probability distribution but still satisfies the weaker inequalities
Note, that the sum on the l.h.s. is not independent of y n unlike for the chronological probability distribution µ. Nevertheless, it is bounded by something (the r.h.s) which is independent of y n . The reason is that the sum in (9) runs over (partial recursive) chronological functions only and the functions q which satisfy q(y 1:n ) = x <n x ′ n for some x ′ n ∈ X are a subset of the functions satisfying q(y <n ) = x <n . We will in general call functions satisfying (11) chronological semimeasures. The important point is that the conditional probabilities (9) are ≤ 1 like for true probability distributions.
Universality of ξ
AI : It can be shown that ξ AI defined in (9) is universal and converges to µ AI analogously to the SP case (5) and (6). The proofs are generalizations from the SP case. The actions y are pure spectators and cause no difficulties in the generalization. This will change when we analyze error/value bounds analogously to (8). The major difference when incorporating y is that in (5), U (p) = xω produces strings starting with x, whereas in (9) we can demand q to output exactly n words x 1:n as q knows n from the number of input words y 1 ...y n . ξ AI dominates all chronological enumerable semimeasures
ξ is a universal element in the sense of (12) in the set of all enumerable chronological semimeasures. This can be proved even for infinite (countable) alphabet [Hut00b] .
Convergence of ξ AI to µ AI : From (12) one can show
for computable chronological measures µ. The main complication in generalizing (6) to (13) is the generalization to non-binary alphabet [Hut00a] . The y are, again, pure spectators. (13) shows that the µ-expected squared difference of µ and ξ is finite for computable µ. This, in turn, shows that ξ(yx <k yx k ) converges to µ(yx <k yx k ) for k → ∞ with µ probability 1. If we take a finite product of ξ ′ s and use Bayes' rule, we see that also ξ(yx <k yx k:k+r ) converges to µ(yx <k yx k:k+r ). More generally, in case of a bounded horizon h k ≡ m k −k+1 ≤ h max < ∞, it follows that
Convergence is only guaranteed for one (e.g. the true) i/o sequenceẏẋ <kẏẋk:m k but not for alternate sequenceṡ yẋ <k yx k:m k . Since (10) takes an average over all possible future actions and perceptions yx k:m k ; not only the one which will finally occur, (14) does not guaranteeẏ ξ k →ẏ µ k . This gap is already present in the SPΘ ρ models, but nevertheless good error bounds could be proved. This gives confidence that the outputsẏ k of the AIξ model (10) could converge to the outputsẏ k of the AIµ model (3), at least for a bounded horizon h k . The problems with a fixed horizon m k = m and especially m → ∞ will be discussed later.
Universally optimal AI systems: We want to call an AI model universal, if it is µ-independent (unbiased, model-free) and is able to solve any solvable problem and learn any learnable task. Further, we call a universal model, universally optimal, if there is no program, which can solve or learn significantly faster (in terms of interaction cycles). As the AIξ model is parameterless, ξ converges to µ in the sense of (13,14), the AIµ model is itself optimal, and we expect no other model to converge faster to AIµ by analogy to SP (8),
we expect AIξ to be universally optimal. This is our main claim. Further support is given in [Hut00b] by a detailed analysis of the behaviour of AIξ for various problem classes, including prediction, optimization, games, and supervised learning.
The choice of the horizon: The only significant arbitrariness in the AIξ model lies in the choice of the lifespan m or the h k ≡ m k −k+1 if we allow a cycle dependent m. We will not discuss ad hoc choices of h k for specific problems. We are interested in universal choices. The book of [Ber95] thoroughly discusses the mathematical problems regarding infinite horizon systems.
In many cases the time we are willing to run a system depends on the quality of its actions. Hence, the lifetime, if finite at all, is not known in advance. Exponential discounting r k → r k ·γ k solves the mathematical problem of m → ∞ but is no real solution, since an effective horizon h ∼ ln 1 γ has been introduced. The scale invariant discounting r k → r k · k −α has a dynamic horizon h ∼ k. This choice has some appeal, as it seems that humans of age k years usually do not plan their lives for more than the next ∼ k years. From a practical point of view this model might serve all needs, but from a theoretical point we feel uncomfortable with such a limitation in the horizon from the very beginning. A possible way of taking the limit m → ∞ without discounting and its problems can be found in [Hut00b] .
Another objection against too large choices of m k is that ξ(yx <k yx k:m k ) has been proved to be a good approximation of µ(yx <k yx k:m k ) only for k ≫ h k , which is never satisfied for m k = m → ∞. On the other hand it may turn out that the rewards r k ′ for k ′ ≫ k, where ξ may no longer be trusted as a good approximation of µ, are in a sense randomly disturbed with decreasing influence on the choice ofẏ k . This claim is supported by the forgetfulness property of ξ (see next section)and can be proved when restricting to factorizable environments [Hut00b] .
We are not sure whether the choice of m k is of marginal importance, as long as m k is chosen sufficiently large and of low complexity, m k = 2 2 16 for instance, or whether the choice of m k will turn out to be a central topic for the AIξ model or for the planning aspect of any universal AI system in general. Most if not all problems in agent design of balancing exploration and exploitation vanish by a sufficiently large choice of the (effective) horizon and/or a sufficiently general prior. We suppose that the limit m k → ∞ for the AIξ model results in correct behaviour for weakly separable (defined in the next section) µ, and that even the naive limit m → ∞ may exist.
Value bounds and separability concepts: The values V * ρ associated with the AIρ systems correspond roughly to the negative error measure −E nρ of the SPρ systems. In the SP case we were interested in small bounds for the error excess E nΘ ξ − E nρ . Unfortunately, simple value bounds for AIξ or any other AI system in terms of V * analogously to the error bound (8) can not hold [Hut00b] . We even have difficulties in specifying what we can expect to hold for AIξ or any AI system which claims to be universally optimal. In SP, the only important property of µ for proving error bounds was its complexity K(µ). In the AI case, there are no useful bounds in terms of K(µ) only. We either have to study restricted problem classes or consider bounds depending on other properties of µ, rather than on its complexity only. In [Hut00b] the difficulties are exhibited by two examples. Several concepts, which might be useful for proving value bounds are introduced and discussed. They include forgetful, relevant, asymptotically learnable, farsighted, uniform, (generalized) Markovian, factorizable and (pseudo) passive µ. They are approximately sorted in the order of decreasing generality and are called separability concepts. A first weak bound for passive µ is proved.
Time Bounds and Effectiveness
Non-effectiveness of AIξ: ξ is not a computable but only an enumerable semimeasure. Hence, the outputẏ k of the AIξ model is only asymptotically computable. AIξ yields an algorithm that produces a sequence of trial outputs eventually converging to the correct outputẏ k , but one can never be sure whether one has already reached it. Besides this, convergence is extremely slow, so this type of asymptotic computability is of no direct (practical) use. Furthermore, the replacement of ξ by time-limited versions [LV91, LV97] , which is suitable for sequence prediction, has been shown to fail for the AIξ model [Hut00b] . This leads to the issues addressed next.
Time bounds and effectiveness: Letp be a policy which calculates an acceptable output within a reasonable timet per cycle. This sort of computability assumption, namely, that a general purpose computer of sufficient power and appropriate program is able to behave in an intelligent way, is the very basis of AI research. Here it is not necessary to discuss what exactly is meant by 'reasonable time/intelligence' and 'sufficient power'. What we are interested in is whether there is a computable version AIξt of the AIξ system which is superior or equal to any program p with computation time per cycle of at mostt.
What one can realistically hope to construct is an AIξtl system of computation time c·t per cycle for some constant c. The idea is to run all programs p of length ≤l := l(p) and time ≤t per cycle and pick the best output in the sense of maximizing the universal value V * ξ . The total computation time is c ·t with c ≈ 2l. Unfortunately V * ξ can not be used directly since this measure is also only semi-computable and the approximation quality by using computable versions of ξ given a time of order c·t is crude [LV97, Hut00b] . On the other hand, we have to use a measure which converges V
Outlook & Discussion
This section contains some discussion and remarks on otherwise unmentioned topics.
Value bounds: Rigorous proofs of value bounds for the AIξ theory are the major theoretical challenge -general ones as well as tighter bounds for special environments µ. Of special importance are suitable (and acceptable) conditions to µ, under whichẏ k and finite value bounds exist for infinite Y , X and m.
Scaling AIξ down: [Hut00b] shows for several examples how to integrate problem classes into the AIξ model. Conversely, one can downscale the AIξ model by using more restricted forms of ξ. This could be done in a similar way as the theory of universal induction has been downscaled with many insights to the Minimum Description Length principle [LV92, Ris89] or to the domain of finite automata [FMG92] . The AIξ model might similarly serve as a super model or as the very definition of (universal unbiased) intelligence, from which specialized models could be derived.
Applications: [Hut00b] shows how a number of AI problem classes, including sequence prediction, strategic games, function minimization and supervised learning fit into the general AIξ model. All problems are claimed to be formally solved by the AIξ model. The solution is, however, only formal, because the AIξ model is uncomputable or, at best, approximable. First, each problem class is formulated in its natural way (when µ problem is known) and then a formulation within the AIµ model is constructed and their equivalence is proven. Then, the consequences of replacing µ by ξ are considered. The main goal is to understand how the problems are solved by AIξ. For more details see [Hut00b] .
Implementation and approximation: The AIξtl model suffers from the same large factor 2l in computation time as Levin search for inversion problems [Lev73, Lev84] . Nevertheless, Levin search has been implemented and successfully applied to a variety of problems [Sch97, SZW97] . Hence, a direct implementation of the AIξtl model may also be successful, at least in toy environments, e.g. prisoner problems. The AIξtl algorithm should be regarded only as the first step toward a computable universal AI model. Elimination of the factor 2l without giving up universality will probably be a very difficult task. One could try to select programs p and prove VA(p) in a more clever way than by mere enumeration. All kinds of ideas like, heuristic search, genetic algorithms, advanced theorem provers, and many more could be incorporated. But now we have a problem.
Computability: We seem to have transferred the AI problem just to a different level. This shift has some advantages (and also some disadvantages) but presents, in no way, a solution. Nevertheless, we want to stress that we have reduced the AI problem to (mere) computational questions. Even the most general other systems the author is aware of, depend on some (more than complexity) assumptions about the environment, or it is far from clear whether they are, indeed, universally optimal. Although computational questions are themselves highly complicated, this reduction is a non-trivial result. A formal theory of something, even if not computable, is often a great step toward solving a problem and has also merits of its own (see previous paragraphs).
Elegance: Many researchers in AI believe that intelligence is something complicated and cannot be condensed into a few formulas. They believe it is more a combining of enough methods and much explicit knowledge in the right way. From a theoretical point of view, we disagree as the AIξ model is simple and seems to serve all needs. From a practical point of view we agree to the following extent. To reduce the computational burden one should provide special purpose algorithms (methods) from the very beginning, probably many of them related to reduce the complexity of the input and output spaces X and Y by appropriate pre/post-processing methods.
Extra knowledge: There is no need to incorporate extra knowledge from the very beginning. It can be presented in the first few cycles in any format. As long as the algorithm that interprets the data is of size O(1), the AIξ system will 'understand' the data after a few cycles (see [Hut00b] ). If the environment µ is complicated but extra knowledge z makes K(µ|z) small, one can show that the bound (13) reduces to ln 2·K(µ|z) when x 1 ≡ z, i.e. when z is presented in the first cycle. Special purpose algorithms could also be presented in x 1 , but it would be cheating to say that no special purpose algorithms have been implemented in AIξ. The boundary between implementation and training is blurred in the AIξ model.
Training:
We have not said much about the training process itself, as it is not specific to the AIξ model and has been discussed in literature in various forms and disciplines. A serious discussion would be out of place. To repeat a truism, it is, of course, important to present enough knowledge x ′ k and evaluate the system output y k with r k in a reasonable way. To maximize the information content in the reward, one should start with simple tasks and give positive reward to approximately the better half of the outputs y k , for instance.
